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This paper studies the premiumspaid in successful tender offers andmergers involving
NYSE and Amex-listed target firms from1975-91 in relation to pre-announcement stockprice
runups. It has been conventional to measure
corporate control premiums including the price
runups that occur before the initial formal bid. There has beenlittle evidence on the relation
between the pre-bid runup and thepost-announcement premium (the premium paid totarget
stocltholders measured from the date of the firstbid). Under what circumstances arerunups
associated with larger total premiums? Theevidence in this paper shows that in mostcases, the
pre-bid runup and the post-announcement
premium are uncorrelatetj (i.e. little or no substitution
between the runup and thepost-announcement premium), so therunup is an added cost to the
bidder. This has important implicationsfor assessing the costs of illegal insidertrading based
on private information about a potential bid.
G. William Schwert
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1.Introduction
Many studies have documented the large premiums paid by bidder firmsto acquire control
of exchange-listed target fin-us. The size andvariability of these control premiums raise several
interesting questions. For example, it is conventional to include a period ofpre-bid runup in the
targets stock price as part of the control premium paid by winning bidders.As shown below, the
average runup is about half of the total premium paid in successful takeovers(the other part of the
premium is the markup over the stock price the day before the first bid isannounced). What causes
pre-bid runups, and how do they affect the total control premium? Thesequestions provide the focus
for this empirical study of 1,398 successful takeoversof New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
American Stock Exchange (Amex) -listedtarget firms for the 1975-91 period.
The spate of insider trading cases associated withmergers and acquisitions (M&A) during
the 1980s drew significant attention to theconsequences of such activities. Meulbroek (1992) shows
that daily stock returns are correlated with theillegal trading activities of insiders for firms where
the Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.)successfully prosecuted insider trading. She
estimates that almost half of therunup in the month before initial merger or tender offer
announcement occurs on the days when insiders traded illegally,although insiders traded on a small
subset of the days in the runup period onaverage.
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) study 172 successful cash tenderoffers in the 198 1-85period.
They conclude that there are several sources of legitimate informationavailable to market
participants that allow investors to anticipate takeoverannouncements, including announcements
of 1 3D filings when investors acquire more than 5%ofthe target firm's stock. They find weak
evidence that pre-bid runups substitute for post-bidmarkups in their sample, so that premiums areSchi.'ert: MarA-up Pricing in M&A
higher ceferis paribus when runups arelarge.
The question of whether illegai insider
trading damages bidders by raising theprice paid to
acquire a target ni-rn has been highly contentious.
There are many lawsuits againstinvestment banks
and others who might have leakedprivate information that led toillegal insider t.rading. For
example, Anheuser-Busch sued Paul Thayerand A. G. Edwards because it feltthat leaks of inside
information b' Thayer (a director ofAnheuserBusch) caused it topay too much in acquiring
CampbellTaggartin 1982.' Litton sued LehmanBrothers because insidertrading by Dennis Levine
allegedly caused Litton to pay too muchwhen it acquired Itek in 1983.2Maxus sued Kidder
Peabody, Ivan Boesky and MartinSiegel because the price it paid toacquire Natoinas in 1983 was
allegedly inflated by Boesky's illegal insidertrading.3 FMC Corporation sued GoldmanSaclis,
Boesky and others because theprice it paid stocitholders in its 1986recapitaiization plan was
allegedly inflated by the insidertrading activities of Boesky.4
This paper examinesthetheoretical and empirical relations betweenpre-bid runups and post-
bid markups conditionalon various types of information thatwere available in the market prior to
merger or tender offer bids from 1975-91. Section
2 reviews the literature on auctionsand develops
the hypotheses to be tested.Section 3 describes thesample of mergers and acquisitions thatare used
in the tests. Section 4
analyzes several regression tests that relatepre-bid runups to post-bid
markups. Section 5 analyzes alternate
specifications for some of the statisticaltests. Section 6
contains bnef concluding remarks.
AeepBuschCs. Paul elaL. No, CA3-S57R(N. Tex.1988). SeeCornellandSi (1992) for an analysisof this case.
LittonIndustries . Lhma, arathers Ku eb734F. Supp. lOll (S.D.Y. 1990). Maxusv. Kidder Peabody, eta!., No.Sl-15583M(298D. Tex. 1987).
FMCCorporagon . Boesky. eta!. 852F.2d 981,994(7thCir.1988).Sc/iwer,. Murk-up Pricirg ii, M&A
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2.Auctions, private information and insidertrading
To understzmd the effects of pre-bidrunups on M&A negotiations, it is useful to think of the
following time line of events:
TimliflofMA Events (MeasuringtheTotal Premium)
First Bid Final Annouucement
Outcome
I I I Pre-bidRunup Period Post-bid Markup Period
In the Pre-bid Runup Period, the bidderknows that it is considering making a bid fora particular
target firm, but no one else should have this private information.Of course, it is possible that more
than one bidder is considering the
acquisition of this target simultaneously, but the intentions of each
bidder are not generally known by others.Any abnormal movement of the target's stock price in this
period is called the Pre-bid Runup. Once the First BidAnnouncement occurs, public investors
become aware of that bidder's intentions(at least to the extent that they are revealed by theirbid).
After that time, the target is "in play" and it ispossible that other bidders may compete to acquire
the target firm. Such a multiple bid auctionusually leads to higher control premiums than when the
initial bid is successful. The Final Outcomeoccurs when one bidder succeeds in taking over the
target, or when all bidders quit tiying. If the target isacquired by a bidder, the Post-bid Markup
Period represents the period between the First BidAnnouncement and the Final Outcome, so that
the change in the target firm's stock price in thisperiod (perhaps adjusted for market movements)
reflects the Post-bid Markup.4
Schwer:: Mark-up Pricing in M&A
2.1 Conpetirive bidding strategies
Therearc at least two competing hypothesesabout the effects of earlyrevelation of
information in a merger or tender offer situation.If the bidder and target(managers and
stockholders) are in a two-personbargainingsituation, negotiation will lead to aconsummated deal
if the reservation price of the target is below thevaluation placed on the target by the bidder.These
valuations by the bidder and the target dependon the information each party has at the time ofthe
negotiation. To the extent that both parties havemore information than is reflected in theopen
market price for the target firm's stock (andthey think there are no other traders with valuableprivate
information), both the bidder and the target wouldignore stock price movements that occurprior to
and during the negotiation in setting the finaldeal price. As a result, the post-bidmarkup (measured
from the announcement date through the timewhen all uncertainty about the consummationof the
deal has been resolved) will be lowerby the amount of the pre-bid runup. This is thesubstitution
hypothesis --eachdollar of pre-bid runup offsets thepost-bid markup one-for-one.
On the other hand, if the bidderor the target is uncertain about whethermovements in the
market price of the target's sharesmight reflect valuable private information of othertraders, runups
during the negotiations could well cause bothparties to the negotiation to revise their valuations of
the target's stock. Forexample, if the negotiating parties suspect that another biddermight be
acquiring target shares in the open market, both thebidder and the target (management and
stockholders) would probably revise their valuationsof the target stock upwards. Bradley, Desai and
Kim (1988) and Comment and Schwert(1994) show that the premiums paid in contested M&A
transactions (auctions) are significantly higherthan in cases where multiple bidders do notappear.
In this case, the final deal price willincrease by the amount of the pre-bidrunup. The post-bidSch'.'ert. Mark-up Pricing in MA 5
markupwill be unaffected by the amount of thepre-bid runup. This is the markup pricing
hypothesis --eachdollar of pre-bid runup gets added into the final dealprice one-for-one.
As described above, the markup pricing hypothesis reflectsrational behavior of bidders and
targets in a situation where they have incomplete information. An additionalexplanation for a lack
of Substitution between therunup and the markup is based on irrational behavior by bidders. Roll
(1986) calls this the "hubris hypothesis," where biddersare interested in winning a takeover contest
irrespective of the cost. One way to distinguish between themarkup pricing and hubris hypotheses
is to study the stock returns to the bidder firm, if thebidder firm offers too much for the target firm,
given the information available to the stock market at the time of thebid, one would expect a drop
in the bidder's stock price.
2.2Relation to the literature on auctions
Ananalogy to conventional open outcry English auctions is apt.3 If the itembeing auctioned
is marketable, as is clearly the case with thecommon stock of a publicly traded target finn, part of
the value any bidder would place on the item is basedon its potential resale value (this is called a
common value auction). Of course, every bidder might also haveunique reasons for wanting to own
a particular item, and this valuation might be larger than the resale value(this is called a private
value auction). In general, most auctions reflecta mixture of common and private values (this is
called a correlated values auction). The typical situation wherecompeting bidders can observe the
bids of others causes complicated interactionsamong bidders' strategies. To the extent thatanother
SeesectionX of McAfee andMcMillan(1987) for a discussion of the correlated values auction model where
bidders'valuationsareaffiliated. Milgrogn(1989)provides an excellent survey of the economics literature on auctions, and
Ashenfelcer (1989) provides many interestinginsights intothe workings of auction markets for high quality wine and art.Schwert; MarA-ap Pricing in M&A
bidder rmght have better information about the resale value of thetarget firm, his bid should alter
the perceptions of competing bidders about resale value. Ineffect, each bidder learns by observing
the current market price. This is the spirit of theself-fulfilling rational expectations models of asset
prices developed by Grossman (1976, 1977).
The presence of people who trade on the information of either thebidder or the target without
the knowledge of the negotiating parties is like havinga shill in the audience at an open outcry
auction. Based on unusual price arid volume behavior in thesecondary market for the target's stock,
the bidder and arget might falsely conclude thata legitimate competing bidder exists, and hence
revise their valuations upward. By stealing information from thebidder or the target, insider trading
can cause the final price in the auction (or negotiation) to behigher than it would otherwise be.
2.3Relation to the efficient markets literature
Thesemi-strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis posits that the marketprice of
common stock reflects all publicly available information [Fama(1970)]. Private information, such
as the intention to bid for control of a target firm, wouldnot generally be reflected in the market
price of the target stock until an event occurs thatcauses many traders to infer that private
information. An example would be pre-bidpurchases of the target's stock by the bidder to establish
a 'toe-hold' position, which would lead to the filing ofa 13D statement with the Securities and
Exchange Comjnissjon (S.E.C.) after the bidder buysmore than 5%ofthe target's stock. Unusual
patterns of price and trading volume often attract attention from securitiestraders (as well as the
stock exchanges and the S.E.C.), and of coursepublic statements such as press releases and S.E.C.
filings provide direct information about potential bids.
One implication of the efficient marketshypothesis is that future price changes areSchwerr.' Mark-up Pricing in M&A 7
unpredictablebased on publicly available information. It should not be possible to earn systematic
abnormal profits by buying stock in companies that are potentialtargets (without access to private
or inside information). There is much evidence to support the efficient markets hypothesis in the
context of mergers and tender offers. For example, measured from the date of the first announced
bid, there is no evidence that public investors can earn average abnormal returns frompurchasing
the stock of target firms. Not surprisingly, the stock prices oftargets that are successfully taken over
rise above the market price on the day after the first bid, onaverage, and prices fall if the targets are
not successfully taken over, on average. But it is not possible to know which bids will succeedor
fail at the time of the first bid, so it is not possible to profit.6
If future price changes are unpredictable, there should be no correlation betweenpast price
movements (such as pre-bid runups) and subsequent returns to target shareholders. If this were not
true, it would be profitable to buy shares of stocks whose prices have risen recently (perhaps with
unusual volume behavior). Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) find there are no abnormal profits
available from buying the shares of companies that are written about in the Wall Street Journal
"Heard on the Street" column as potential takeover targets (where most of the stories identi1' unusual
price and volume behavior as one source of the rumor). Thus, from the perspective of target
shareholders, it would not be surprising to find that pre-bid runups and post-bid markups are
unrelated. The only exception to this rule would occur if the bidder and/or the target effectivelypre-
announce the bid. In that case, everyone (including bidder and target stockholders and management)
knows the information in the actual offer before it is formally filed. The formal announcement of
the offer would have little effect on the market price of the stock, since all of the relevant parties
6Doddand Ruback(1977). Dodd(1980). and Bradley. Desai and Kim (3983) are early papers that document these
facts.Also see the survey paperbyJensen andRuback (1983).8 Schwert.'Mark-up Pricing in M&A
already know this information.
2.4 Inferring information about illegal insidertrading
How likely is it that the market can infer the existence ofillegal insider trading? In the
United States, which has severe punishments associated with
illegal insider trading, people who
acquire inside information and trade on it have strong incentivesto disguise their behavior. There
are many mechanisms used by regulators to detect illegal insidertrading. For example, the New
York Stock Exchange monitors trading of all of its listedstocks and uses statistical screens to
identify unusual patterns of price or volume. Theseevents trigger investigations by calling the
affected company to ask whether there is materialinformation that could be causing the unusual
trading pattern. In extreme cases, the S.E.C. is notified and itbegins its own investigation. Faced
with knowledge of these enforcementmechanisms, sophisticated traders who have inside
information try to avoid trading patterns that would leadto easy detection by spreading their trading
over many accounts and brokerage firms, and byspreading their trading over time [Stewart (1991)].
Even if there were no legal costs associated withinsider trading, insiders have strong
incentives to disguise their behavior so that othertraders cannot easily infer the information they
possess from their trading behavior. For example,many buy orders submitted by an insider in a
short period are likely to attract attention from"tape watchers" who trade based on current market
movements. To maximize the value of the private information hepossesses, an insider must delay
the revelation of that information to othertraders as long as possible (until he has boughtas many
target shares as he wants). Barclay and Warner (1993)study trading patterns in the shares of 105
tender offer targets from 1981-84during the 30 trading days before formal offers. They find that
most of the price appreciation before formal bidsoccurs in intermediate-sized trades (500 to 9,900Schwert; Mark-up Pricing in M&A 9
shares), rather than larger or smaller trades. They refer to this behavioras "stealth trading.' Of
course, once the insider accumulates his desired position, he benefits fromspeedy revelation of his
private information (which is one reason insiders might share information withothers whom they
know will trade on inside information).
Another cost that can result if insider trading is readilyapparent is that planned bids can be
canceled. A bidder who sees the target pricerunup unexpectedly might decide to postpone or cancel
a planned bidwhiletrying to learn why the runup had occurred. Diamond Shamrock canceled its
planned bid for Natomas after Ivan Boesky's insider trading caused amore than twenty percent runup
in Natomas' stock price during Februaiy 1983.Shortly after the decision to cancel the offer,
Natornas' stock price plummeted, in largepart due to selling pressure from Boesky (who had been
tipped by Martin Siegel, Diamond's investment banker).7 if insidertrading results in a canceled
offer, the profitability of the inside information is negatedby the insider's trading behavior.
While the highly publicized cases involving Dennis Levine,Boesky and Siegel have focused
attention on insider trading associated with M&A transactions inrecent years, these cases were
discovered several years after the insider trading took place.Moreover, they were discovered
through a very indirect sequence of circumstances [Stewart (1991)]. Table I shows the number of
stories on Dow Jones News Retrieval (DJNR) containing the words "insidertrading" for the years
1979-92. This is a noisy measure of the public's awareness of insidertrading associated with M&A
transactions, since many of these stories do not involve mergers or tender offers. The explosion of
stories about insider trading began in 1986 with the Boesky revelations,so it is unreasonable to think
that investors or bidder or target firm managers should have known about insidertrading several
'Maxus v. Kidder Peabody, Boesky, Siegel, eta).. Second AmendedOriginal Petition by Plaintiff. No. 87-15583.M
(298D. Tex. 1987)..i o Schwerr: Mart-up Pricing in M&A
yearsbefore the U. S. government discovered it.
Thus, the question of whether pre-bid runups caused by insider trading affect theprice
negotiated between a bidder and a target in a merger or tender offer revolves around whether all
parties to the transaction (bidder and target management and stockholders) understand that the
insider trading merely reflects the private information of the negotiating parties. Ingeneral, since
insider trading is illegal, and because the profits of the insider will generally be higher if hecan delay
the process by whichothertraders infer his information, we should expect that targets and bidders
will no know with certainty that pre-bid runups merely reflect their own information. Interms of
the hypotheses stated earlier, it is unlikely that the substitution hypothesis(pre-bid runups substitute
for post-bid markups) is a good description of the world. The tests below show howrunups and
markups are related in a large sample of actual merger and tender offer transactions in the 1975-91
period.
3. Mergers and tender offers, 1975-91
To study the relation between pre-bidrunups and post-bid markups, I use Robert Comment's
proprietary database containing information about all mergers and tender offers for NYSE and
Amex-listed target firms from 1975-91. These announcementswere obtained through various
keyword searches of the Dow Jones News/Retrieval database, by inspection of the Wall Street
Journal index, and from Commerce Clearing House's CapitalChanges Reporter (the original source
for CRSP delisting codes). Security return and volume data and marketindexes are from the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
There are 1.398 successful takeovers from 1975-91 withenough return data available to be
included in this study. For each of these firms, I calculated the market modelregression equationSchwerz; Mw-k-up Pricing in M&A
(I) for the 253 trading days ending 127 trading days before the first public announcement of a tender
offer or merger.
=a+3R,, + e,,, t =-379,-- ., -127 (1)
where R is the continuously compounded return to the stock oftarget firm i and R is the
continuously compounded return to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of NYSE and Amex-listed
stocks for day t. Firms are included if they have at least 100dailyreturns available to estimate the
parameters of (1). The runup is the cumulative abnormal return to the target stock over the 42-day
runup period before the first bid,
Runup, = Cu, (2)
=-42
and the markup is the cumulative abnormal return from the date of the first bid announcement
through delisting or 126 trading days after the first bid, whichever comes first,
delisting
Markup1= c. (3)
The total premium paid by the successful bidder (Premium1), adjusted for market movements, is the
sum of Runup1 and Markup.
Because there are some deals that take a long time to consummate, I focus on the sample of
cases where the length of time between the first bid and delisting is no more than a year. Some deals
take a long ume to complete because regulatory hurdles have to be jumped. The noise added to the
siock returns of these target firms due to the delay is the primary reason for ignoring these cases. InSch,.'ert: 4ark.up Pricing inM&.A
addition, there are some cases where the size of the target firm is so small (less than $10 million
market value of equity) or the price of the target stock is so low (less than $2 per share) that the
measured stock returns could be unreliable. Low-priced stocks are likely to be more affected by
market microstructure effects, such as large proportional bid-ask spreads [Ball, Kothari and Shanken
(1994)]. After excluding these exceptional cases, there are 1,173 target finns remaining. This is
called the main sample" hereafter.
The choice of a 42 trading day (about two calendar months) runup period is suggested by the
empirical evidence trom prior studies on mergers and tender offers. Figure 1 shows the plot of the
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) from 126 trading days before the first bid
announcement (day 0) through 253 trading days after the first bid for the 1,398 successful mergers
and tender offers in this sample, where the market model parameters were estimated using returns
for days -379 to -127 relative to the announcement day. The CAR starts to rise around day -42, but
the largest pre-bid rise occurs from days -21 to -1.
3.1Averagerunupsand markups
Table2 shows the average runups and markups for the total sample and for several subsets.
It also shows the proportion of the various samples that have pre-bid news implying that a bid might
be forthcoming (News), or that involve multiple bidders (Auctions), or that are tender offers (Tender
Offers), or that are management buyouts (MBOs), or where cash is the only form of payment to
target shareholders (Cash), or where equity is the only form of payment to target shareholders
(Equity), or where the S.E.C. later accused someone of engaging in insider trading prior to theSchwert: Mark-up Pricing i,i M&A 13
takeover(Insiders).8 Results are shown for each of these samples, along with samples of deals that
began in each year from 1975-91. Finally, table 2 shows the standard deviations for the sample of
all1,398 deals and the mainsample of 1,173 transactions in the rows immediately following the
averages for these samples.
Runups are large for all these samples. The average for the main sample is 14.2%, and it is
a little higher for cases where there was foreshadowing news (16.0%), in tender offers (15.9%), and
in cases where the S.E.C. later accused insiders of trading illegally (18.5%). Average runups are
slightly lower in cases that later become auctions (12.2%), when there is an MBO(11.4%),and in
cases where equity is the only form of payment made to target shareholders (11.4%). The average
runups and markups shown in bold italicsintable 2 are reliably different from the main sample
averages at the 5% significance level.
Average runups were larger in 1977-80 than at other times during the 1975-91 period.
Average runups were slightly lower after the prosecutions of Levine, Boesky and Siegel that began
in 1986, although the average runups remain substantial (from 7.1% to 13.5% from 1986-91). The
following regression provides a simple test of the effects of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984 (1TSA84) and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFE88),
Runup, = 0.1779 -0.06441TSA841 + 0.0033 ITSFE881 + u, (4)
(0.0084)(0.0120) (0.0155)
where White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. The insider
trading law variables are equal to zero before 1984 and 1988, respectively, and equal to one
$Informationon insidertrading prosecutions came from the Dow JonesNews Retrieval, theWallStreet Journal
index,and the Lexis S.E.C.Release file.14 Schwert:Mark-up Pricing inM&A
afterwards.This regression suggests that the 1984 Act is associated with significantly lower pre-bid
runups (-6.4% lower), but the 1988 Act had no significant additional effect. This simple regression
does not take account of other changes in the legal and takeover environments that occurred in this
period, so these conclusions are tentative at best.
Average post-bid markups are similar to average runups for most of the samples. The
average markup for the main sample is 15.9%. The most obvious exception is for auctions, where
the average markup is 28.0% and the average runup is 12.2%. This is easy to understand if the
competition among multiple bidders is generally not anticipated at the ume of the first bid. The
average premium (the sum of runup plus the markup) is between 24.0% (in 1978) and 40.9% (in
1988). A regression similar to (4) to estimate the effects of the changes in insider trading legislation
on post-bid markups suggests that markups increased reliably (by 8.3%) following the 1988 Act, but
not following the 1984 Act,
Markup = 0.1376 +0.0078ITSA84 +0.0832ITSFE881 +Ui. (5)
(0.0103)(0.0154) (0.0228)
However, it is likely that other changes in the merger and acquisition environment could also explain
the higher premiums after 1988. For example, Comment and Schwert (1994) argue that increases
in antitakeover protection that occurred from 1983-91 increased the premiums paid to target firms
that were taken over.
3.2Composition of the sample
Thereare prior news events suggesting that the target may be in play in 47.3% of the cases
in the main sample. News equals one when any of the following events have occurred within theSchwerr: Mark-up Pricing inM&A
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pastcalendar year:
(a)there was a news story, confirmed by either the target or the bidder firm, saying
that a merger or acquisition was being actively discussed, or
(b)there was a newsstoiy saying that a 13D form had been filed with the S.E.C.
showingthat a new buyer had bought at least 5% of the target's stock, or
(c)there was a news story saying that the firm is a potential target, or
(d)the target firm adopts a new poison pill security as an anti-takeover device
(based on information from DowJonesNews Retrieval and Corporate Control
Alert).
Mikkelsonand Ruback (1985) find that the market interprets at least some 13D announcementsas
showing that the likelihood of a takeover has increased. Comment and Schwert (1994) show that
poison pill security adoptions frequently foreshadow takeover bids. These pre-bid news events
happen more frequently in auctions (59.2%) and when there is an insider trading prosecution
(62.7%). The frequency of prior news events is lower before 1980, becausecoverage by Dow Jones
News Retrieval begins in mid-1979, and other sources of this information have lesscoverage.
Auctions occur in 19.0% of the cases in the main sample. They are more frequent when there
is a tender offer (30.4%). The frequency of multiple bidder auctions increased in the late 1980s,
rising to 35.3% of the takeovers in 1988. As the number of takeovers fell in 1990-91, the frequency
of auctions also fell.
Tender offers represent 44.8% of the main sample. They are more frequent when there is a
subsequent insider trading prosecution (58.2%). They are less frequent when the winning bidder
involves the incumbent management of the target firm (an MBO), only 30.7%. The years 1984-89
had a higher rate of tender offers than the other parts of the period (from 44.6% to 63.9%).
Management buyouts (MBOs) represent 11.9% of the main sample. Cash deals represent 63.5% andto Sche,i;itlarA-.up Pici,jg inMSA
equity deals represent 17.3% of the main sample.
There were insider trading prosecutions in 11.4% of thecases. The rate of insider trading
prosecutions is highest for the deals that began from 1981-85 (from13.1% to 27.7%). Of course,
the increased rate of prosecutions could reflecta higher frequency of illegal insidertrading, or a
higher rate of discovering and prosecuting illegal trading,or both. One explanation for this drop in
prosecution rates is the increased penalties associated with the InsiderTrading Sanctions Act of 1984
and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud EnforcementAct of 1988.
Arshadi and Eyssell (1991) find that insiders whomust register their trades with the S.E.C.
changedtheir trading patterns before tender offers afterthe 1984 Act. Before 1984, registered
insiders were strong net buyers of theirown firms stock, but afterwards they became weaknet
sellers. They also find that pre-bidrunups are positively correlated with the trading of registered
insiders. Of course, the sample of insiders usedby Arshadi and Eyssell is a small subset of thetypes
of people who have been prosecutedby the S.E.C. for insider trading beforemergers or tender offers
--theofficers, directors and beneficial owners of thetarget firm. Their trades are easiest to monitor,
since they have to be reported to the S.E.C.on a timely basis (which is the source of data usedby
Arshadi and Eyssell). In unnegotiated offers, thesepeople might not even be aware of the intentions
of the bidding firm. The most
prominent insider trading cases prosecuted by the S.E.C., and theones
where the cause of the pre-bidrunup would be ambiguous to the target and bidding firms, involve
third party insider trading --peoplewho obtain and misuse information fromagents of the bidder
or the target.
The evidence in table 2 providesa useful summary of the characteristics of the sample, both
in terms of the types of dealscovered and the times when they occurred. Thetests below provide
a more structured basis for judging the effectsof runups on the price paid by bidders in successfulSchw err; Mark-up Pricing in M&A 17
mergersand tender oilers.
4. Regression tests for substitution betweenrunups and premiums
4.1Simple regression lests
Theeasiest way to test whether there is substitution between pre-bidrunups and post-bid
markups is to consider the relation between the total premium paid by the bidder and thepre-bid
runup,
Premium1 =a+bRunup1 +Ui. (6)
As described in section 2. 1, the substitution hypothesis implies that the totalpremium is not affected
by pre-bid runup, so the slope coefficient b in (6) should equal zero. On the other hand, themarkup
pricing hypothesis implies that the total premium increases one-for-one with the pre-bidrunup, so
the slope coefficient b in (6) should equal one. An estimate of b betweenzero and one implies
partial substitution; that is, the pre-bid runup increases the total premium paid by the bidder, but
only as a fraction of the size of the runup (where the coefficient b represents that fraction).
Since the total premium is the sum of the runup plus the markup, the regressionequation (6)
is equivalent to the regression of markup onrunup,
Markup1 =a+(b-I)Runup1 +Ui. (7)
If the substitution hypothesis is true, the regression of Markup, on Runup1 should havea coefficient
of -l (i.e., when runup is higher, markup is lower by the same amount). If themarkup pricing
hypothesis is true, the regression of Markup1 on Runup1 should have a coefficient of zero (i.e.,s Schwer:; Murk-up Pricing inM&A
markupis unrelated to runup).
Table3 cornains estimates of the regression model (6) for the all 1,398merger and
acquisitions, for the main sample of deals consummated within a year, and forsamples with prior
foreshadowing news (News=l), for samples without prior foreshadowing news(News=0), for
auctions (Auctions= 1;, for single-bidder deals (Auctions=0), for tender offers(Tender Offers= 1),
for mergers (Tender Offers=0), for management buyouts (MBOs=1), for all-cashdeals (Cash=1), for
all-equity deals (Equitv= I), for deals that subsequently had insider trading prosecutions(Jnsiders=1),
and for deals that did not have insider trading prosecutions (Insiders=0). Thesecond column shows
the proportion of the main sample represented by eachsample and the third colunm shows the
number of target firms used in each regression. The fourththrough sixth columns contain estimates
of the intercept, a, its standard error, S(a),andthe t-statisuc for whether a equals zero, t(a=0). The
seventh and eighth columns contain estimates of the slope, b, its standarderror, S(b),whilethe ninth
colunu) shows a t-test, t(b=1), for whether there is substitution betweenrunup and markup in
determining the total premium paid by successful bidders (i.e., is the coefficient bsignificantly
different from one?). Finally, columns ten and eleven contain thestandard error of the regression
S(u) and the adjusted coefficient of determination, k2.
Inthe main sample, the estimate of the coefficient forRunup, b, is 1.017, which is close to
the value implied by the markup pricing hypothesis, and the t-statistic forwhether b equals one is
0.42. Across the samples based on deal characteristics, the lowestestimate of b is 0.649 (in deals
where there was subsequent prosecution for insidertrading) and the t-statistic for whether this
estimate is different from one is -3.20. The othersample where the estimate of b is reliably lower
than one is for tender offers, where the coefficient estimate is0.881 with a t-statistic of -2.04. Thus,
even the smallest estimates of the substitution coefficientimply that at least 65% of the pre-bidSchwert: Mark-up Pricing in M&A I9
runupis added to the total price paid by the bidder in acquiring atarget stock.
The intercept in equation (6) estimates theaveragepost-bid markup paid in mergers and
acquisitionswhen there is no pre-bid runup. Note that in cases where the slope coefficient b is less
than one, the intercept a is larger than the average markup in table 2 (forexample, in insider trading
cases,a = 0.278and the average markup in table 2 is 0.2 13). This differencemeasures the effect of
pre-bid runup on lowering the average post-bid markup --anotherway of seeing that the effect of
substitution is not large.
Table3alsoshowsestimates of the regression model (6) for samples basedonthe year when
thefirst bidoccurs. Most oftheestimates ofthe coefficient forRunup1, b, areclose toone (therange
of theseestimates isfrom 0.76to 1.34). Only oneof the i-statistics for substitutionis below -2
(1986), andthreeare larger than2(1980, 1983 and1988),which implies thatpremiumsare higher
than averagein cases with large runups. Overall, there is little reason to think that there is variation
in the amount of substitution over the 1975-91 period.
4.2 Multiple regression models for substitution
Table 4 combines the effects of these different samples into a multiple regression. Since
several characteristics of successful deals are correlated (e.g., cash deals and tender offers), it is not
possible to disentangle separate effects of these characteristics from the simple regressions in table
3. Instead, the multiple regression.
7 7
Prernium =a0+ b0Runup1+ EakD11 + EbkDb Runup1 + c,, (8) kI k=I
where the dummy variablesequal one if the kth characteristic (News, Auctions, Tender Offers,20 Sch.'.erz: Mark-up Pricin8 in M&A
MBOs,Cash, Equity, or Insiders) applies to case i, and equal zero otherwise, allow the intercept a
and the slope b to vary' with the characteristics of the deal. Consistent with the evidence in table 3,
the estimates of the markup paid if the runup equals zero (i.e., the intercepts) are reliably higher
when there is a multiple bidder auction (coefficient =11.8%,t-statistic =4.36),when there is a
tender offer (coefficient =8.3%,t-statistic =3.76),when cash is used to pay target shareholders
(coefficient =9.9%,t-statistic =3.03),and when there is illegal insider trading that is later
prosecuted (coefficient =12.3%,t-statistic =4.02).The large sample joint test for whether all seven
intercept-change coefficients equal zero equals 99.1, which has a p—value less than 0.01% compared
with a x2 distribution with 7 degrees of freedom.
The runupcoefficientestimate is 1.146, with a standard en-or of 0.132, when all of the seven
deal characteristics equalzero. Mostof the slope change coefficients (bk)forthe dealcharacteristics
are small, and only the insider trading coefficient (-0.372) is reliably less than zero (t-statistic of
-3.22). The large sample joint test for whether all seven slope change coefficients equal zero equals
15.0, which has a p-value of 3.6% compared with ax2 distribution with 7 degrees of freedom. To
estimate the sensitivity of the total price paid to the pre-bid runup for a deal with some of these seven
characteristics the base case slope coefficient, b= 1.1456,is added to the appropriate slope change
estimates. For example, for a cash tender offer that is not an auction or an MBO, and where there
is no subsequent insider trading prosecution, the estimated slope coefficient is 1.1456 -.1417-.0539
=.9500.
The estimates in table 4 confirm the results from table 3. There is some substitution between
pre-bid runups and post-bid markups for cases where the S.E.C. subsequently prosecutes illegal
insider trading, and possibly for tender offers. Overall, however, the extent of substitution is small.
The effects of different types of deal characteristics on the size of theaverage markup, given the sizeSchwer: Mark-up Pricing in M&A 21
of therunup, ismuch largerandmorereliable.
4.3 Differential substitution during the runup period
Tothis point, the runup period has been held fixed at 42 trading days. I have also estimated
some of the results in this paper using shorter and longer runup and markup periods, with no
substantial change in the results.To explore this more systematically, 1 consider nine
nonoverlapping runup periods: [(-1,-I), (-2,-5), (-6,-b), (-1 l,-21), (-22,-42), (-43,-63), (-64,-84),
(-85,-l05), and (-106,-126)1, and fourteen markup periods: [(0,126), (0,delisting), (0,0), (1,1), (2.5),
(6.10), (11,21), (22,42), (43,63), (64,84), (85.105), (106,126), (127,253) and (254,delisting)). Table
5 contains estimates of multiple regressions of the returns for the main sample for each of the
fourteen markup periods on the nine runup returns,
9
Markup=a+ Ebk Runupk÷ c, (10)
k=I
wherethe coefficients bk should equal zero if the markup pricing hypothesis is true and they should
equal -1 if the substitution hypothesis is true. The coefficient estimates that are more than two
standard errors from zero are shown in bold italics.
Thereis evidence of partial substitution using the markup return on days 0 and + 1, since the
coefficient estimates are negative for many of the runup periods. The largest of these estimates are
for the announcement day markup return (day 0)and the runup periods covering the week before the
first bid. Day -l has a coefficient of -0.252 and days -2 through -5 have a coefficient of -0.234,
implying that the markup return on the announcement day is lower by about -0.25 times the runup
that occurred in the prior week. When looking at longer markup periods, such as the (0,126) periodSchwert: Mark-up Pricing in M&A
used elsewherein this paper, the evidence for partial substitution for the day -1. runup remains
reliably different from zero (coefficient of -0.335 with a t-statistic of -4.06). However, the estimates
of the runup coefficients for earlier periods are generally positive, and some are reliably different
from zero. The small negative coefficients for the announcement day 0 are offset by small positive
coefficients at longer lags. Most of the coefficients that are more than two standard errors from zero
after day +1 are positive [for example, in the ranges (11,21) through (106,126)]. Thus, the strongest
evidence in favor of the substitution hypothesis finds the markup is reduced by only about a quarter
to a third of the runup in the week before the first bid. There is no reliable evidence of substitution
in other runup periods.
4.4Effects of runup in the bidder'sstockprice
Inaddition to the runup in the target's stock price, market participants can also observe the
runup in the bidders stock price before the date of the first bid. To the extent that information about
a pending bid leaks to the market, it should be reflected in the bidder's stock price as well as the
target's (if there are significant value implications for the bidder). To check whether the bidder's
runup affects the premium paid for the target firm, I include the 42-day runup in the bidder's stock
return along with the target runup,
Premium1 =a+bRunup1 +cRunup1, +t,. (11)
Estimates of (11) are shown in table 6 in a format similar to table 3 for the 761 cases where the
bidding firm is an exchange-listed firm. For the main sample of 657matchedtargets and bidders,
the estimate of the bidder runup coefficient c is 0. 121 (t-statistic of 1.20), showing a weak positive
relation between the runup of the bidder's stock price and the premium paid for the target. TheSchwert: Mark-upPricing in M&A 23
estimates of the bidder firm runup coefficient are positive for most of the samples. The largest
positive bidder runup coefficient estimates are for auctions (0.576, with a t-statistic of 2.64) and for
tender offers (0.254, with at-statistic of 2.51). Only the estimate for the small sample of 16 MBOs
(where a publicly traded firm participates along with the target firm's management to make a bid)
has a large negative estimate of -0.435 (t-statistic of -1.15), and the average bidderrunup for this
sample is -2.4%, implying that the target's premium is higher as a result of the negative bidder runup
in these cases.
Table 6 also shows the average bidder runup and markup (measured from the date of the first
bidthrough 126trading days after the first bid) for each of the samples. Compared with the target
runups, the bidder runups are small, but most are positive. The largest positive bidder runups are
when there is foreshadowing news (1.7%) and when the S.E.C. subsequently prosecutes illegal
insider trading (2.4%). Unlike the pattern with target finns,wherethe average runup and markup
are similar, the markups for bidder firms are generally negative. The average for the main sample
is -2.4%. The most negative bidder markups are for auctions (-8.2%), MBOs (-7.7%) and for all-
equity deals (-6.3%). To the extent that auctions are unanticipated at the time of the first bid, the
negative bidder markups reflect the costs of increased competition for the target firm. On the other
hand, since the average runups and markups have different signs for most of the samples, it seems
that the act of bidding conveys negative information that was not known during the runup period.
4.5Effects of abnormal trading volume
Besidesprice runups, it is also common to see unusually high levels of share trading volume
before announcements of merger and acquisition activity. For example, Pound and Zeckhauser
(1990, TableS) show that takeover rumors published in the "Heard on the Street" column of the Wall24 Schwert.- MarL-up Pricing in M&A
StreetJournal oftenmention unusualprice andvolumebehavior for the stock in question.
Meulbroek (1992, Table XIII) shows that trading volume is unusually high ondays wheninsiders
trade before takeovers. She also shows that trading volume is unusually highduringthe20 trading
daysbeforetakeover bids, even after netting out the trades of insiders who were prosecuted for
insider trading.
Information about trading volume, as well as price, prior to a formalmerger or tender offer
bid might help bidders judge whether their information had been leaked to the market. To check this
possibility, I use data from CRSP to estimate a model for daily share trading volume for the 1,169
target firms for which adequate share trading volume are available. The volume model is:
Cn(q/q1) =p+pQn(q1/q2) +'rn(q/q,.1) +y,Qn(q,.1/a2) +o0R +a1R +v,1,(12)
where n is the natural logarithm, q1 is share trading volume for firm i on day t,q is share trading
volume for the exchange where this firm is traded (either NYSE or Amex) on dayt, and Rd is the
stock return for firm i on day t. This model expresses the growth rate in sharetrading volume,
as a function of the previous growth rate, the current and lagged growth rate of market
trading volume, tn(q.jq,,,1), and the current and lagged return on the stock Modeling share trading
volume in terms of its growth rate, with lagged values of the explanatory variables is in the form of
an "error-correction model.'1° This allows share trading volume to be non-stationary, but it also
allows for transitory movements in volume that affect future volume growth. Theaverage estimates
of the parameters of this model are in table 7, along with theaverage t-statistics.
Donaldson and Hatheway (1993) also study intraday price andvolumebehavior before a small number of tender
offers.
'°
Engleand Granger (1987) discussthe ermr correctionmodel andits applicationto economic time series.Sch,erz; Mark-up Pricing in M&A 25
Theaverage estimate of the coefficient of lagged share volume, p, implies a tendency for
unusual movements in share volume to be partially reversed. If this coefficient was zero, changes
in log share volume would be entirely permanent (e.g., log share volume would follow a random
walk, ignoring the other parameters in the model). When this coefficient is negative, changes in log
share volume are partly transitory. The average coefficient estimate of -0.417, with an average t-
statistic of -7.25, is consistent with log share volume having both permanent and transitory
components.
The average estimates of the market share volume growth coefficients, Yo and y1, imply
comovement of trading volume across stocks. The long-run effect of a one percent increase in
market trading volume is (y0 + y1)/(1-p),which averages 0.790 across these 1,169 finns.
There is a weak positive association between share trading volume growth and stock returns.
The average estimate of the contemporaneous coefficient, t3,., is 3.878, with an average t-statistic of
1.56. The long-run effect of a one percent increase in the stock return is (o+6 ) / (1 -p),which
averages 2.488.
Using the regression models summarized in table 7, 1 predict the growth in trading volume
from 42 days before through 126 days after announcement of the first bid. Figure 2 shows the
proportion of abnormal returns and volumes that are positive for the event days from -40 to +40
around the date of the first bid (day 0). The pattern is similar for returns and volume in the pre-bid
period, with mostly positive abnormal returns and volume in the three days before the bid. After the
bid, the abnormal returns are positive about half the time, but for the first week after the bid volume
is lower than predicted for many firms (about 80% of the abnormal volumes are non-positive on day
-2). After day +10, the abnormal volumes return to more normal behavior, being positive about half
the time.26 Schwerf; Mark-up Pricing in M&A
Table 8 summarizes the volume runup, which is thecumulative abnormalshare volume from
days -42to-Irelative to the first bid,
Volume runup =v, (13)
t= -42
wherev is the prediction error for share volume growth from (12). Across the main sample of
1,169 firms, where delisting occurred within one year of the first bid, the average volume runup is
about 92%. The average is somewhat lower for deals that subsequently turned into auctions, and
much higher for deals where the S.E.C. subsequently prosecuted illegal insider trading.
Panel B of table 8 contains estimates of a regression model that includes dummy variables
for all of the deal characteristics examined previously. It also includes the pre-bid stock price runup,
to see whether the relation between volume and stock prices estimated outside the deal periodis
altered in the runup period before a deal is announced. Based on this regression, the average pre-bid
volume runup is significant even when none of the other deal characteristics is positive, including
the stock price runup. The estimate of the intercept is 66%, with a t-statistic of 3.00. The abnormal
stock price runup has a coefficient of 1.163 (t-statistic of 2.27). implying that stock returns and
volume growth move together more in the runup period than in the prior estimation period. The
auction coefficient is -41.4% (t-statistic of -2.11), implying that volume growth is abnormally low
in cases that later turn into auctions. Finally, in cases where the S.E.C. later prosecuted illegal
insider trading, abnormal volume of is higher by 63% with a t-statistic of 2.33. This raisesthe
possibility that extremely large pre-bid trading volumes trigger S.E.C. investigations.
A remaining question about the behavior of volume runup is whether it influences the post-
bid markup. When the volume runup is added to the regression model estimated in table 4 to explainSchert; Mark-up Pricing in M&A 27
thetotal premium paid by successful bidders, the t-statistic for the volume runup coefficient is 1.26,
implying no reliable effect on the total premium. None of the other regression coefficients is
materially affected. Thus, although there is abnormal volume runup before bids, it does not seem
to affect the price paid by bidders, given the other characteristics of the deal, including the price
runup.
5. Specification analysis
5.]Runup as an artifact of deal size
Oneinterpretation of the pre-bid runup is that it is the probability of a takeover times the total
premium chat will be paid if a takeover occurs:
Runup1 =Prob3Premium3. (14)
Suppose that the total premium for target flims is determined exogenously, and known to the market
in advance, so that the only uncertainty concerns whether a successful takeover will occur. In this
scenario, the size of the premium determines the size of the runup, so the regressions in tables 3 and
4 would reflect reverse causality.
Suppose that a combination of legitimate and illegitimate sources of information caused
every deal to be anticipated with Prob3 =0.5before the first bid. Then, every runup would be half
as large as the total premium. The coefficient of runup in (6) would be (1/Prob), or two, however,
and the post-bid markup would be perfectly correlated with the pre-bid runup. Remember that the
markup pricing hypothesis implies a regression coefficient on runup equal to one, and that the runup
and the post-bid markup are uncorrelated. Appendix A shows that with weaker assumptions about28 Schuert:Mark-up Pricing in M&A
theprobability of a takeover before the first bid (e.g., it is random, but uncorrelated withthesize of
the total premium). the coefficient of runup in (6) will have a probability limit that is lower than
[IIE(Prob)], but greater than one (i.e., runups and markups would be positively correlated).
Therefore, even if one were to suppose that the total premium paid in successful deals was known
in advance, and unaffected by early disclosure of information that causes the runup, the one-to-one
relation between runups and total price paid cannot be explained.
5.2 The runuj, index
If the size of the premium was known a priori, the probability of a successful takeover, Prob1,
could be estimated for any given deal as the runup divided by the total premium, Probe =Runup1'
Premium.This is called the "runup index" by Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and an equivalent measure
is used by Meulbroek (1992).
What can we learn from the runup index? There are several practical problems that must be
addressed. First, how do you treat situations where the runup is negative? Typically, one of two
choices is made: set the runup index to zero, or omit this observation. Second, how do you deal
with cases where the post-bid markup is negative? Again, the usual solution is to set the runup index
to one, or omit this observation. Unfortunately, while these solutions leave a sample of runup
indexes that have the appealing property that they are between zero and one (as a probability
measure should be), this truncation can induce a significant bias into the relation between runup and
total premium.
As an example, table 9 contains estimates of the means and standard deviations of the runup
index and the average runup and premium for the main sample of 1,173 takeovers that were
consummated within a year. It shows the results for the unadjusted data (previously summarized inScIi'er:: Mark-up Pricing in M&A 29
table2), and for both methods of correcting runups and markups so that runup indexes are all
between zero and one. It also shows estimates of the substitution coefficient b from the regression
of total premium on runup (6) for the five sets of data.
The average runup index is 0.589 for the main sample, but it has a standard deviation of
16.73, reflecting many observations outside the (0,1) interval. When some of the outliers are
eliminated by ignoring observations with negative pre-bid runups, there are 912 estimates of the
runup index (77.7% of the main sample). The average runup index from this sample is 0.525, with
a standard deviation of 4.093. When observations with negative post-bid markups are also ignored,
there are only 712 estimates of the runup index (60.7% of the main sample). The average runup
index from this sample is 0.480, with a standard deviation of 0.262. As expected, the average runup
and the average premium are higher, both by about 7%, compared with the original sample. The
estimate of the regression coefficient of total price paid on runup. b, is 0.896 for this sample, with
a standard error of 0.051, so the markup and the runup are reliably negatively correlated. This is an
artifact of truncating the sample to eliminate negative runups and markups. When the negative
runups and markups are set equal to zero, so that the runup index equals zero when runup equals
zero, and it equals one when markup equals zero, the average runup index is 0.462, with a standard
deviation of 0.372. The average runup and markup are higher than for the original sample, but not
by as much as when the negative observations are simply omitted from the calculation. The
regression coefficient estimate is 0.95 1, with a standard error of 0.038, which does not show reliable
evidence of substitution.
5.3 Regressions of premiums on the runup index
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) suggest using a regression of the premium on the runup index30 SchwerL Mark-up Pricing in M&A
totest whether deals where a larger proportion ofthe premium occurs as runup arealso deals with
largerpremiums.Compared with the regression in (6), the regression of the premium on the runup
index,
Premium1=a'+ c (Runup1 / Premium) + u1, (15)
hasseveral statistical problems.First, the regressor in (6), Runup1, is divided by the dependent
variable,Premium,,to create therunupindex, whichcouldinduce negativecorrelationbetween the
premium and therunup index.Second,totheextentthatthesample or the datamustbe truncated
tomake the runupindexlie inthe(0,1) interval, thiscould induce acorrelation betweentheerrors,
u,,and the runup indexbecausethedependentvariable Premium is in the denominatorof the runup
index.
To show these problems, I use a bootstrap simulation where the i-unups from the main sample
of 1,173 takeovers discussed above are added to markups that are randomly selected from the same
set of transactions. This experiment is repeated 1,000 times to show the effects of the statistical
problems with the runup index regression. By construction, the markup pricing hypothesis is true
in this experiment, because the runups and markups are uncorrelated.
Table 10 shows estimates of the runup index regression (15) for the real data and several
summary statistics from the simulated samples. Using the real data, it seems that there is a reliable
negative relation between the runup index and the premium when the cases involving negative
markups and negative runups are omitted (the fourth column of table 10), since the coefficient
estimate is -0.115 and its standard error is 0.031. In the other columns, the coefficient of the runup
index is not more than two standard errors from zero. This would seem to imply that takeovers
where the runup was large (relative to the total premium) were not cases with large premiums.Schwert: Mark-up Pricing in M&A 3 I
However,the simulation evidence in the remaining rows of table 10 shows that these regression
results are not meaningful evidence against the markup pricing hypothesis. In the simulations,
premiums are created by combining runups with randomly chosen markups, so there is no way that
either the bidder or the target could react to a higher than average runup by reducing the subsequent
markup as the substitution hypothesis predicts. The average coefficient of the runup index is close
to zero for the full sample and for cases where the runup is truncated by omitting negative runups
or setting them equal to zero (columns 2. 3 and 5intable 10). In cases where the markup is
truncated by omitting negative markups or setting them equal to zero (columns 4and6 in table 10),
however, there is a strong negative bias; the average runup coefficient is -0.1334 when negative
markups are omitted and -0.0988 when they are set to zero. Thus, although the data are constructed
so that the markup pricing hypothesis is true, the runup index regressions seem to show a lack of
relation, or even a negative relation between runup indexes and premiums. These results are artifacts
of underlying statistical problems.
The last two rows of table 10 show the averages and standard deviations of the t-tests for
whether the runup index coefficient equals zero. Under the null hypothesis that the runup index and
the premium are unrelated, the t-test should have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
The average t-tests show a pattern similar to the average coefficients, with strong negative bias when
negative markups are omitted or transformed (average t-tests of -4.10 and -5.47 in columns 4 and
6). When the negative markups are not omitted or transformed, however, the effect of dividing the
runupbya premium the is close to zero or negative in some cases is to create many outliers, which
explains the very large standard deviations for the t-tests in columns 2, 3 and 5.Thus,the runup
index regression is plagued by two problems: either the runup is divided by the dependent variable
(which includes some values that are close to zero or negative, so outliers occur), or if data are32 Schwert: Mark-up Pricing in M&A
omittedor transformed to solve the outlier problem, this process creates a correlation between the
errors and the regressors, inducing substantial bias.
5.4Can the market predict premiums?
Besidesthe statistical problems caused by negative runups or markups, the runup index has
an important conceptual problem that makes it useless to bidders or targets during the process of a
transaction. While the price and volume runups can be seen by both the bidder and the target at the
time of the first bid, and could affect the subsequent behavior of either party to the transaction, the
runup index can only be calculated after the consummation of the deal (or at least at the end of the
bidding). The hypothetical assumption that the total premium is somehow known in advance is
inconsistent with all of the evidence in this paper.
From table 2, most of the reliable variation of premiums is relaxed to the variation of markups
as the type of deal is learned by the market (e.g., all-cash deals, tender offers, and especially
auctions). There is much less variation in runups across different types of deals. Comment and
Schwert (1994) use several accounting and stock market performance measures to predict takeovers
of exchange-listed firms from 1975-91 and to predict premiums (including a 20 trading day runup
period) conditional on a takeover. They fmd only weak evidence that accounting and stock market
performance variables predict either takeovers or premiums. The most reliable variables explaining
premiums aie auctions, all-cash deals and tender offers, along with yearly dummy variables. Even
including the explanatory variables that are not known at the time of the first bid, the adjusted
coefficient of determination for predicting premiums is only 19.2%. In short, it seems that the type
of competition that the bidder fears is the best systematic explanation for variation in takeover
premiums, and this is not generally known before the first bid occurs.Sch,..'e,t; Mark.tqPricingin M&A 33
6.Conclusions
The preponderance of evidence in this paper supports the markup pricing hypothesis; that
is, the premiums paid to target shareholders in successful mergers and tender offers (measured from
the date of the first bid announcement through delisting) are essentially unrelated to the size of the
price or volume runups that occur before the announcement of the first bid. Even selecting the
results that are most favorable to the notion of substitution between runups and post-bid markups.
which involve cases where the S.E.C. subsequently prosecuted someone for insider trading, the
regression tests show that the post-bid markup is only reduced by one third of the pre-bid runup. In
other words, at least two-thirds of the runup is added to the total premium by successful bidders (the
sum of runups and post-bid markups).
This markup pricing behavior is consistent with rationality since, in general, neither bidders
nor targets (management or shareholders) are certain about the causes of pre-bid runups. To the
extent that an increase in the market price of the target's stock reveals information held by other
potential bidders, perhaps foreshadowing an auction, it is to be expected that the successful deal
price will adjust to reflect this information. From this perspective, the kinds of third party insider
trading prosecuted by the S.E.C. in the l980s (e.g., Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky and Martin Siegel)
impose large costs on financial markets. By stealing a bidder or target firm's proprietary information,
these third party insider traders act like shills in an auction --theyfraudulently fool legitimate
bidders into thinking that there are competing bidders with potentially different private information
who are interested in buying the target. Even the strongest critics of insider trading regulations in
the United States [e.g.. Canton and Fischel (1983) orManne (1966)] do not argue that third party
insider trading based on misappropriated information has societal benefits.34 Scnwerr;Mark-up Pricing in M&A
Some of the resultsraise interesting questions about theenforcement of insider trading laws.
There is some evidence that the cases where the S.E.C. subsequently prosecuted people for insider
trading are different from the overall sample. For example, this subset of about 10% of the sample
has partial substitution between the pre-bid runup and the post-bid markup, and the pre-bid price and
volume runups are unusually large for these cases. Since the prosecutions are generally announced
long after the deal is consummated, it seems that the market can partially infer the existence of this
insider trading before the S.E.C. does. This is consistent with the results of Meulbroek (1992), who
finds that much of the price movements during runup periods occur on days when insiders are
trading. One interpretation is that insider trading occurs in a much larger fraction of the cases, but
the S.E.C. only prosecutes the cases where the effects on price and volume are largest.
In summary, one way to think about the results in this paper is in terms of the random walk
model for stock prices --themarket price on the day before the first bid in a merger or tender offer
sets the level on which subsequent control premiums are determined. It generally does not matter
how that market price was achieved (i.e., how big was the runup during the last month).Scherr: Mark-up Pr!ci#!g ui M1&A 35
AppendixA. The relation between runup and premium when premium is
predetermined
Definerunup forfirm i, R,, as the product of thetotal premiumpaid ifa successful takeover
wereto occur, P.Limesthe probability of a takeover perceived before the date of the first bid, it.
Both R and P aremeasuredas market-adjusted stock returns, so they represent a percentage
deviation from the siock market price measured at the beginning of the runup period. Suppose that
the total premium paid is known in advance to all participants. Further, suppose that the probability
of takeover is uncorrelated with P.
The expected runup would be
E(R) = E(P1).E(it1). (Al)
Thevariance of the runup would be
Var(R)=Var(P)Var(E1) +E(ir1)2•Var(P)+E(P)2•Var(1t1), (A2)
andthe covariance of runup with the total price would be
Cov(R,, P1)=E(it)Var(P). (A3)
Thus,the probability limit of the coefficient from the regression of total premium on runup in (13)
is
plirnb =Cov(R1,P) / Var(R)
=E()•Var(P1) / [Var(P1) .Var(it1)+E(ir1)2.Var(P) +E(P)2•Var(it1)]
=1/ { E(it1) •[1+(VarOt1)/ E(ir)2) •[I+(E(P1)2I Var(P)) 11). (A4)
Ifthe probability of a takeover is constant across all deals. Var(,t1) = 0, and pli,nb= 1/ E(ic). In
general, plimb>1, since the denominator of(A4) will be less than 1. Table Al shows the values
of plimbimplied if the takeover probability has a uniform distribution over the range [l,u] for36 Schwert Mark-up Pricing inM&A
differentvalues of the upper and lower limits 1 and u. It assumes the values of the mean and variance
of the total price from the 1,173 finns in the main sample of exchange-listed takeover targets, E(P)
=0.302,and Var(P,)= 0.1 02. The probability limits for b range from 2.00 to 1.23, being inversely
related to the variance of
TableAl
Coefficients for runup, R. in a regression of total premium paid, P. on R, where the
probability of a successful takeover, ,t,isdrawn from a uniform distribution over the interval
[I,u]. EOt) and Var(7t) are the mean and variance of the takeover probability, respectively.
plirn b is the probability limit of the coefficient of R implied by this model for runup from
(A4), with E(P1) = 0.302. and Var(P) = 0.102 (the values from the main sample of 1,173




limit, u E(it) Var(t) plim b
0.00 1.00 0.50 0.083 1.23
0.05 0.95 0.50 0.067 1.32
0.10 0.90 0.50 0.054 1.42
0.15 0.85 0.50 0.041 1.53
0.20 0.80 0.50 0.030 1.63
0.25 0.75 0.50 0.021 1.73
0.30 0.70 0.50 0.013 1.82
0.35 0.65 0.50 0.007 1.89
0.40 0.60 0.50 0.003 1.95
0.45 0.55 0.50 0.001 1.99
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.000 2.00chneri. Mir&-up Pricingin M&A 37
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Number of Stories in Dow Jones News Retrieval
Containing "Insider Trading" from 1979-92
Percent















Total 1,741 100%Table 2
Averagepre-bid runups (Runup) and post-announcement markups (Markup) for different samples of successful mergers
or tender offers ot exchange-listed target firms. 1975-91. Runupisthe cumulative abnormal return to the target's stock
from day -42 to day - I relative to the first bid. Markup is the cumulative abnormal return to the target's stock from the
day of the first bid through dehsting or 126 trading days after the first bid, whichever comes first. Also, the proportions
of each sample that have pre-bid news implying that a bid might be forthcoming (News), or that involve multiple bidder
auctions (Auctions), or that are tender offers (Tender Offer), or that arc management buyouts (MBO), or that involve the
payment of cash to target shareholders (Cash), or that involve the payment of equity to target shareholders (Equity), or
where the S.E.C. later accused someone of engaging in insider trading prior to the takeover (Insiders).
Sample Tender
Sample Size, N Runup MarkupNews Auctions Offers MBO CashEquityInsiders
All Deals 1,3980.1415 0.1486 0.3970 0.1595 0.3763 0.1001 0,5329 0.14520.0959
Standard Deviation 0.1980 0.2700 0.4895 0.3663 0.4846 0.3003 0.49910.35240.2945
Main Sample 1.1730.1432 0.1591 0.47310.1901 0.4484 0.1194 0.63510.17310.1142
Standard Deviation 0.1907 0.2528 0.4995 0.3926 0.4975 0.3243 0.4816 0.37850.3182
No News 6180.1284 0.1723 0.0000 0.1472 0.3754 0.1100 0.6278 0.21520.0809
News 5550.1598 0.14441.0000 0.2378 0.5297 0.1297 0.6432 0.12610.1514
Auctions 2230.1222 0.2796 0.59191.0000 0.7175 0.1121 0.7354 0.05830.1390
NoAuction 9500.1482 0.1309 0.4453 0.0000 0.3853 0.1211 0.6116 0.20000.1084
Tender Offers 5260.1590 0.2160 0.5589 0.3042 1.0000 0.0817 0.8213 0.01140.1483
Mergers 6470.1304 0.1129 0.4034 0.0974 0.0000 0.1499 0.4838 0.30450.0866
MBOs 1400.1138 0.1258 0.5143 0.1786 0.30711.0000 0.7786 0.00000.1357
Cash 7450.1451 0.1945 0.4792 0.22010.5799 0.14631.0000 0.00000.1221
Equity 2030.1136 0.1084 0.3448 0.0640 0.0296 0.0000 0.0000 1.00000.0591
Insiders 1340.1850 0.2126 0.6269 0.2313 0.5821 0.1418 0.6791 0.08961.0000
Nolnsiders 1.0390.1379 0.1522 0.4533 0.1848 0.4312 0.1165 0.6295 0.18380.0000
1975 190.1208 0.2020 0.0526 0.4211 0.0526 0.5789 0.2632 0.00000.0000
1976 350.1659 0.1536 0.25710.1143 0.3143 0.0000 0.5429 0.28570.0286
1977 590.2281 0.1365 0.2034 0.1695 0.3390 0.0339 0.5763 0.23730.0169
1978 650.1 941 0.0456 0.2462 0.1385 0.4154 0.0462 0.6000 0.13850.0462
1979 680.2516 0.1079 0.294!0.1765 0.397!0.0000 0.5735 0.13240.0294
1980 720.1959 0.1035 0.36ll 0.1806 0.2917 0.0833 0.61110.22220.0556
1981 650.1386 0.2329 0.3846 0.2000 0.4000 0.0615 0.5692 0.20000.2769
1982 720.1461 0.1825 0.5278 0.1528 0.3194 0.1944 0.61110.16670.1944
1983 750.1247 0.1285 0.5733 0.1600 0.2533 0.2133 0.6267 0.18670.1467
1984 840.1396 0.1109 0.4524 0.1905 0.4762 0.2024 0.73810.10710.1310
1985 1010.1278 0.1135 0.4851 0.1485 0.4455 0.1287 0.6337 0.13860.2772
1986 1160.0939 0.1657 0.5345 0.1810 0.5862 0.1552 0.7069 0.112!0.0862
1987 990.0995 0.1837 0.5859 0.2727 0.5455 0.1818 0.6162 0.1919.0.0808
1988 1190.1345 0.2745 0.6807 0.3529 0.6387 0.1597 0.73110.11760.0588
1989 680.1124 0.1777 0.6912 0.2206 0.6029 0.0882 0.6765 0.14710.0882
1990 350.0714 0.1864 0.5429 0.05710.4000 0.05710.5714 0.34290.257l
199! 210.1064 0.2044 0.4762 0.0000 0.2857 0.0476 0.4286 0.47620.0476
No4eAveragenrnups nd markups thai isa saliably dffeient from the main sample mean *5 the 5% significwsce level we sbown us boW italic:.Table 3
Regressionsof the total premium paid to target stockholders (Premium) on the pie-bid runup (Runup,) for vanous
samples of successful mergers and tender offers for exchange-listed target firms. 1975-91
Premium = a + b Runup, + u,,
where Premium, = Runup, + Markup, Runup, is the cumulative abnormal return to the target's stock from day -42 to
day -l relative to the first bid. Markup is the cumulative abnormal return to the target's stock from the day of the first
bid through delisting or 126 trading days after the first bid, whichever comes first. The substitution hypothesis implies
b < 1, while the markup pricing hypothesis implies b = I. S(u) is the standard error of the regression and is the
adjusted coefficient ot determination. White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
ProportionSampleConstantStd ErrorT-statisticSlopeStd ErrorT-statistic
Sample of SampleSize, N a S(a) t(a=0) b S(b)t(b1) S(u)
All Deals 1,3980.13820.010513.11 1,07330,04271.72 0.26970.383
Main Sample 1,1730.1567 0.010415.141.0169 0.04030.42 0.25290.370
No News 52.7% 6180.16830.0145 11.631.0318 0.05890.54 0.25380.349
News -17.3% 5550.14200.01489.62 1.01510.05520.27 0.25150.395
Auctions 19.0% 2230.2783 0.0244 11.40 1.01030.11690.09 0.27450.268
NoAuction 81.0% 950 0.12540.0111 11.28 1.03710.04210.88 0.23910.419
TenderOffers 44.8% 526 0,2349 0.0144 16.280.8812 0.0584-2.04 0.24100.311
Mergers 55.2% 6470.10240.01367.521.0808 0.0525 1.54 0.25210.411
MBOs 11.9% 140 0.13480.02435.550.92110.1087-0.73 0.20630.336
Cash 63.5% 7450.19840.0118 16.880.9732 0.0475-0.56 0.23830.376
Equity 17.3% 2030.09520.02324.10 1.11610.09901.17 0.26380.400
Insiders 11.4% 134 0.27760.02919.550.6486 0.1098-3.20 0.21810.178
No Insiders 88.6% 1.039 0.14670.0108 13.531.0402 0.04230.95 0.25550.384
1975 1.6% 19 0.21080.05353.940.9270 0.2690 -0.27 0.23630.310
1976 3.0% 35 0.16450.06642.480.93410.2182 -0.30 0.26980.302
1977 5.0% 59 0.19130.05283.630.7597 0.1472 -1.63 0.21740.255
1978 5.5% 65 0.02030.05210.391.1305 0.15110.86 0.23820.428
1979 5.8% 68 0.1553 0.04973.120.81150.1340 -1.41 0.20670.343
1980 6.1% 72 0.0592 0.03951.501.2260 0.11292.00 0.23540.518
1981 5.5% 65 0.2454 0.04835.070.91010.1981-0.45 0.26760.223
1982 61% 720.18850.03585.260.95940.1349 -0.30 0.21200.481
1983 6.4% 75 0.0902 0.03182.84 1.30650.13202.32 0.21380.606
1984 7.2% 84 0.1093 0.02664.111.0116 0.13410.090.1966 0.434
1985 8.6% 1010.1047 0.02843.691.0683 0.14990.460.1950 0.351
1986 9.9% 1160.1882 0.02377.930.7597 0.1007-2.39 0.22530.236
1987 8.4% 99 0.1979 0.03465.730.85710.1287-1.11 0.28140.269
1988 10.1% 1190.22930.04.445.171.3363 0.16182.08 0.32560.400
1989 5.8% 68 0.1478 0.03853.841.2655 0.14531.83 0.27650.496
1990 3.0% 35 0.1746 0.04833.611.1658 0.24300.68 0.26310.387
1991 1.8% 210.1940 0.05643.441.0973 0.39260.25 0.30710.273
Joint test for equality of the yearly intercepts or slopes. 35.49 30.36
1975 to 1991. distributed 2(16)Table 4
Amultipleregressionof the toLalpremium paidto target stockholders(Prcmium) on the pre-bid runup (Runup,)and
dun-uny variables for various characteristics of successful mergers and tender offers for exchange-listed target firms.
1975-91:
Premium = a1 + b, Runup, + a, D,, + b, D Runup1 + U,,
where Premium, Runup, + Markup,. The dummy variables appear separately to represent changes in the intercept
a,, and they interact with Runup, to represent differences in the effect of pre-bid runups on the total premium paid,
b,. Runup, is the cumulative abnormal return to the target's stock from day -42 to day -l relative to the first bid.
Markup, is the cumulative abnormal return to the target's stock from the day of the first bid through delisting or 126
trading days after the first bid, whichever comes first. The characteristics of deals that arc used in the regression
include: pre-bid news implying that a bid might be forthcoming (News), multiple bidder auctions (Auctions), tender
offers (Tender Offer), management buyouts (MBO), the payment of cash to target shareholders (Cash), the payment
of equity to target shareholders (Equity), and whether the S.E.C. later accused someone of engaging in insider trading
before the takeover insiders). The substitution hypothesis implies b < I. while the markup pricing hypothesis implies
b = I.is the adjusted coefficient of determination. White's(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
are used. The c-statistic for the runup coefficient tests whether it is equal to one; the other 1-statistics test whether the
coefficients equal zero. The tests for whether all of the coefficients representing intercept (a,) and slope changes (b,)
equal zero, which have a large sample X2 (7) distributions, and their p-values are also shown.
Variable Coefficient
Intercept. a, Slope, bk
Std ErrorT-StatisticCoefficientStd ErrorT-Statistic
Constant 0.0404 0.0366 1.10
Runup 1.1456 0.1324 1.10
News -0.0468 0.0204 -2.29 -0.0056 0.0807 -0.07
Auctions 0.1 ISO 0.0270 4.36 0.0693 0.1254 0.55
Tender Offers 0.0827 0.0220 3.76 -0.1417 0.0811 -1.75
MBOs -0.0211 0.0249 -0.85 -0.0892 0.1093 -0.82
Cash 0.0988 0.0327 3.03 -0.0539 0.1136 -0.47
Equity 0.0519 0.0411 1.26 0.0080 0.1527 0.05
Insiders 0.1229 0.0306 4.02 -0.3717 0.1155 -3.22
Degrees of Freedom 1,157
0.4379
Standard Error 0.2389



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Average estimates of thecoefficientsof the dailyshare tradingvolume prediction model for 1.169 NYSE
and Amex-listed target In-ms that were taken over from 1975-91 (omitting target firms with stock prices
below $2 per share, with equity capitalization less than $10 million, and where it takes more than oneyear
from the first bid to consummate the transaction). For each fir-rn, a year of daily share trading volume data
is used to estimate the regression,
en(q,/q1,.1)=i+ p Qn(q1/q1 2)+y1fn(q,Iq1)+y1 fn(1/q,.,2)+ö0R ÷6 R +v,
where c, is share trading volume for target firm i on day t, cj,.,, is share trading volume for all shares on the
exchange where target firm i is listed on day t. and R is the continuously compounded return to the stock
of target firm i on day t for trading days -379 to -127 relative to the first bid date. The results in this table
show the average values of these coefficients and the average t-statistics from these 1,169 regressions. The
implied long-run effects of a one percent change in either market trading volume growth, or of the target
firm's stock return are also shown (adjusting for the effects of including lagged values of the variables).






Intercept, p -0.0076 -0.12
Lagged share volume growth, p -0.4171 -7.25
Market share volume growth, y 0.7785 2.63
Lagged market share volume growth, -y 0.3430 1.12
Stock return, â,, 3.8776 1.56
Lagged stock return, a1 -0.3443 -0.08
Standard error of regression, S(v) 0.9818
Long-run effects of a one pereent changein:
0.7902 Market share volume, (To + y)/ (1 p)
Stock Return, ( + 6) / (1 -p) 2.4883Table 8
Cumulativeaverage abnormal share trading volume growthfordays -42 to-I relative to the announcement
of the first bid for 1,398 NYSE and Amex-listed target firms that were taken over from1975-9!.For each
firm, a year of daily share trading volume data is used to estimate a regression model (see table 7) to predict
daily share volume, ending 126 trading days before the date of the first bid.
Average
Sample Sample Size, N Volume Runup
Full Sample 1,398 0.8973
Main Sample 1.169 0.9160
News 555 0.9522
Auctions 223 0.6343





Cross sectional regression model explaining pie-bid volume runups during days -42 to-I relative to the
announcement of the first bid for 1,169 exchange-listed target firms taken over from 1975-9 1 as a function
of the stock price runup, whether there is news that might foreshadow the bid, whether the bid is a tender
offer, whether the bid is an MBO, whether cash is the sole compensation for target stockholders, whether
equity is the sole compensation for target stockholders, whether multiple bidders eventually compete to
acquire this firm, and whether the S.E.C. eventually prosecuted people for insider trading in this transaction.
is the adjusted coefficient of determination and S(v) is the standard deviation of the regression residuals.
The standard errors use White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-statistic
Constant 0.6597 0.2195 3.00
Stock price runup 1.1627 0.5132 2.27
News -0.0205 0.1752 -0.12
Tender Offers 0.293 7 0.2025 1.45
M130s 0.2533 0.2883 0.88
Cash -0.0945 0.2044 -0.46
Equity 0.0218 0.2705 0.08
Auctions -0.4139 0.1960 -2.11
Insiders 0.6298 0.2709 2.33
Degrees of freedom 1,160
1 0.0098














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EventDate Relative to First Bid
FigureI. Cumulative average abnormal returns io target firmsstocks fromtrading day -126 to +253 relative to the first bid. All NYSE
and Amex-listed targets that were successfully taken over in the period 1975-91. Market model parameters used to define abnormal




0.20% —— — — — —
10%
-40 .35 .30 .33 20 .15 -tO .5 0 5 50 15 20 25 30 35 40
EventDateRelativeto FuitBid
Figure 2. Proportion ofabnormalreturns and volumegrowth ratesthat are poSitive foreachof theirading daysfrom -40to ÷40 relative to
the first bid. Based on allNYSEand Amex-listedtargetsthat were nicceufully taken over in the period 1975-91. Regression models
used to define abnormal returns or volume arc estimated using data for days -379 to -127 relative to the day of the first bid.
-126 -105 -84 -63 -42-21021 42 63 84 105 126147168189210 231252